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Application of Method of Systems Potential in Economics: 
Hysteresis Loops and Business Cycle; 
The Great Depression of 1930’s as Mathematical Catastrophe  
Of Economic System springing of Infringement of Collegiality.  
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Introduction 
At the Conference in Systems Dynamics held in 2003 a Method of Systems Potential was 
proposed [22], according to which the development of some systems arising spontaneously in 
nature and in the society may be interpreted as a process of realisation of their “potential”. We 
attempted to develop this system approach further and apply it to the Economic System. 
In the first part of this essay we present the mathematical consequences ensuing from this 
method. The second part contains the application of this method to economy. The fourth part 
provides some factual data verifying the theoretical conclusions.  
The most interesting result of the Method is the conclusion about the coordinate 
origination of irregular cyclical dynamics as a result of indefinitely small fluctuations of system 
parameters. The dynamics of “Realisation Ratio”,  R , the index of efficiency of system work, 
comprises two phases of continuous growth (2→3 and 4→1) and two jumps – up (3→4) and 
down (1→2) (Fig.1). 




 is ratio of 
“conditions of realization”, U  to “potential”, Φ of the system [22]. The cause of jumps lies in 
the properties of function  () R z . This function pictured in Figure 5 has only turn-point of 
maximum,  0 z :  () 0 1 Rz = . Function  ( ) R z  consists of two branches, lower branch ( 0 zzR >⋅) 
and  upper branch ( 0 zzR < ⋅ ). Function  ( ) R z  is multivalent function within the left-hand 
neighbourhood of the point  0 z  provided the systems parameter χ  satisfies the following 
inequation:  0 χ > . 
This case  0 χ >  is shown in the Figure 1. The jumps transfer the system from one branch 
of function  () R z  to another branch. These jumps take place at limiting points,  0 z  and  1 z  of 
domain within which function  ( ) R z  is multivalent:  10 zz z < < . Every such jump is a 
mathematical catastrophe. The position of these limiting points depends on the values of system 
parameters. The direct cause of these jumps is fluctuation of system parameters. For the jump to 
take place, indefinitely small fluctuation of limiting points  0 z  and  1 z  is enough. The cycles made 
of jumps and stages of continuous change are well-known from the mathematical catastrophe 
theory. These are the so-called hysteresis cycles (or loops). 
We assumed that the basis of business cycle of economic system is a hysteresis 
evolutional cycle (hysteresis loop). We suggest identifying the industrial crises that are regularly 
experienced by the economy with micro catastrophes of the economic system. These micro 
catastrophes are system jumps from the top branch of function  ( ) R z  to the lower branch (Fig.1). 
Jump down 1→2 is a  crisis phase of a cycle; jump up 3→4 is a  revival phase of one; 
continuous growth along lower evolution branch 2→3 is a depression phase and finally the 
continuous growth along top evolution branch 4→1 is a prosperous phase of business cycle. 
This assumption is factually confirmed by analysis of data showing the change of the basic 
economic indexes during the cycle, some of these data are presented in the last, fourth section of 
this paper. 
This method makes it possible to explain in quantitative terms the dynamics of the basic 
economic indices in the United States in 1920’s and during the Great Depression. From the 
point of view of Method of Systems Potential, the Great Depression of 1930’s was a 
mathematical catastrophe of Economic System. The profundity and duration of this 
catastrophe were expressly strengthened by the shift to the left (towards reduction) of the point 
0 z  in which function  () R z  has maximum value (Figure 2). This shift was a consequence of  
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considerable increase of long-term productivity of capital in the twenties. The reason why the 
shift was so rapid lies in infringements of collegiality principle. These infringements are briefly 
described in the third part of the essay. 
I.  Method of Systems Potential. Mathematical results. 
The Method offers describing the state of systems using two terms, “potential of a 
system”,  Φ and “conditions of realization of potential”, U . These quantities satisfy the 
following properties: 
1.  Structure of potential. “Potential”, Φ consists of two parts: (1) the potential being 
realised,  R Φ  which is used and shows itself through the system’s activity; and (2) the 
non-realised potential,  D Φ  which is not used by the system: 
D R Φ + Φ = Φ .          ( 1 )  
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= ,          ( 3 )  
   () 01 Rz ≤≤ .           ( 4 )  
3.  Entropy principle. “Conditions”, U  and “non-realized potential”,  D Φ  decrease on the 
basis of radioactive decay law: 
t U UI ∆ ⋅ ⋅ Λ − = ∆ ,   0 > Λ ,        ( 5 )  
t d D D ∆ ⋅ Φ ⋅ − = ∆Φ ,   0 > d .        ( 6 )  
4.  The growth of “realized potential” and “conditions” is proportional to “activity” of a 
system. Designating as  A “activity” per unit of time, we get: 
() t A r A U U II ∆ ⋅ ⋅ = ∆ ,          ( 7 )  
() t A r A R ∆ ⋅ ⋅ = ∆Φ Φ ,   0 > Φ r .      ( 8 )  
5.  “Activity” of a system is a process of realization of its “potential”. Therefore the 
greater ”realized potential”;  R Φ , the greater is “activity” of a system,  A. We get in linear 
approximation: 
R A Φ ⋅ =ε ,  0 > ε .          ( 9 )  
6.  Evolution equations of a system following from (1)-(9): 
   () da d R Φ+ ⋅Φ= + ⋅ ⋅Φ  ,         ( 1 0 )  
  UUR ν +Λ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅Φ  ,          ( 1 1 )  
where 
   ε ⋅ ≡ Φ r a ,  ε ν ⋅ ≡ U r .         ( 1 2 )  
It is not difficulty to derive from formulas (2), (3), (6), (8) - (12) the following two 
equations respecting functions  () R t  and  ( ) R z :  
   () () 1 R adR R =+⋅ ⋅ −  ,         ( 1 3 )  
   () () ( ) ( ) ( )
2 0 z Ra d z R d z a d R a d R ν ⎡⎤ ′ ⋅− + ⋅ ⋅ + − Λ ⋅ + + ⋅ − + ⋅ = ⎣⎦ . (14)  
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These are principal equations of our research. Solution of equation (13) is a logistical 
function: 















≡ .       ( 1 5 )  
Equation (14) is the first-order ordinary differential equation of Jacobi’ type. This 























0 .           ( 1 7 )  
Function  () ξ ζ  satisfies the following equation: 
() { } ()
2
11 1 1 ba B b a B ξ ζ ξξ ξ ζ ξ ′ ⋅⋅+ −⋅=⋅ +⋅ + ⋅ ;       ( 1 8 )  





= −= −+ Λ .      ( 1 8 A )  





0 :   1 zRz z R CR R
χ χ + − −− =⋅ − ⋅ ⋅− ;   (19) 
subject to  R z z ⋅ < 0 ; 
Lower branch: 
() () ( )
1 ()
0 :   1 zRz z R CR R
χ χ + + +− =⋅+ ⋅ ⋅− ;   (20) 
subject to  0 zzR >⋅; 
where 
( ) 0 C
− > ; 
( ) 0 C





≡ χ ,  
a
Λ
< < − χ 1 .         ( 2 2 )  
Three qualitatively different cases are possible: (1)  0 χ > , (2)  0 χ =  and (3)  1 0 χ −< <  
(Fig.5). Function  () R z  is multivalent function within the domain  10 zz z < <  provided  0 χ > .  
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.          ( 2 5 )   
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Inequation  10 zz <  ( 10 zz > ) follows from inequation  0 χ >  (1 0 χ − << ). In the case 
10 zz >  function  () R z  is multifunction in the whole domain of the function (Fig. 5). When  0 χ =  
the function is one-valued function, and its chart is broken line, which consists of two linear 
segments (Fig.5): 
( ) ( )
() () ()
00 1 zC z C R z C R
−− − =− + + ⋅ = − ⋅ −  ;   subject to  0 0 zz < < ;   (26) 
( ) ( )
() () ()
00 1 zC z C Rz C R
++ + =+ − ⋅ = +⋅ −  ;   subject to 
( )
0 zz С
+ << ; (27) 
() ()
0 CCz
++ =−  ; 
() ()
0 CCz
−− =+  .        ( 2 8 )  
The trajectory of a system  ( ) ( ) () ; zt Rt is drawing the curve  ( ) R z  on the plane ( ) ; zR. A 
system moves along top (19) or lower (20) branch of function  ( ) R z . 
Let us consider the case  0 χ > . If the system parameters ν , a , Λ , d  are strictly constant, 





→ =  (formula (15)). It is evident, however, that in no real system the condition of 
permanency of these parameters is true. Fluctuations of these parameters will excite quasi-
periodic oscillations in Realization Ratio of a System. 
In this case the smooth gradual growth of the Realisation Ratio along top (4→1) or lower 
(2→3) branch will be interrupted by jumps (from one branch to another branch: 1→2 and 3→4) 
in the neighbourhood of points  0 z  and  1 z  respectively. These jumps will form the evolutional 
hysteresis cycle shown in Figure 1. 
The duration of such cycle is random variable the mean value by which depends on the 
fluctuation value,  0 z δ  and  1 z δ  of bifurcation points  0 z  and  1 z  respectively. The smaller the 
fluctuations, the longer are the cycle.  
According to formula (15) duration of phase of continuous growth of Realization Ratio 
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⎝⎠
.          ( 2 9 )  
Let  () 2 R t  be the maximum value of Realization Ratio if the fluctuation  0 z δ  takes place. 





max 0 0 0 1
1 R
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δ
δδ −≡ = − ≈ −
′
.       ( 3 0 )  


















δ − ≡− ≈    subject to  0 χ = .        ( 3 2 )  
As far the value of fluctuations grows, the jumps become less and less regulated, and the 
cycle gradually degenerates becoming a random walk from one branch to another. The hysteresis  
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cycle and the jumps mean that the detailed description of system dynamics requires the use of 
methods of mathematical catastrophe theory. The surface of catastrophe is the surface 
() () ,, Rz C χ
± . At fixed values of 
( ) C
+  and 
( ) C
−  we have a two-parameter catastrophe with 
limitations regarding the domain of function  ( ) , Rzχ : 
a
Λ
< < − χ 1  and  0 z > ; and domain of 
values of this function:  () 01 Rz ≤≤  (catastrophe with boundaries). This is a much more 
complicated catastrophe than Whitney’ “cusp”. The fold line here consists of right line  0 z z =  and 
line  () χ 1 z  defined by means of formulas (24)-(25). The surface having  0 1 z = , 
( ) ( ) 0.3 CC
+− ==  
is shown in Figure 4. 
II.  Application of the Method to Economic System. 
Realization Ratio characterizes the extent of using the potential of the system, that is, the 
useful output of the system or, talking in technical terms, its efficiency. In the economic system 
the use of economic potential means the output of production. Therefore the greater the “realized 
potential”,  R Φ , the greater is the output in economic system, Y . 
So we have supposed that the “Realised Potential of Economic System”,  R Φ  can be 
measured by Output (that is by the Gross National Product) in it, Y : 
Y R = Φ .            ( 3 3 )  
  The second assumption concerns the “Total  Potential” of Economic System”. The 
course of reasoning was like this. The economic potential characterizes the capacity of a system 
to manufacture a product. Therefore the economic potential includes all the factors that may be 
used for production: labor, capital, land, human capital and etc.  
We supposed the following: (1) the “Total Potential of Economic System” is a sum of 
production factors “potentials” and (2) the “potential” of each factor is equal to quantity of 
the factor multiplied by the marginal productivity of one. 




YF ′ ⋅ ∑ .          ( 3 4 )  
It is known from microeconomics that the three tasks of the society of firms in terms of its 
behaviour on the competitive market are: 1) maximisation of profit, 2) maximisation of output 
subject to of stable costs, 3) minimisation of costs subject to of stable output yield the following 
first-order optimizing condition: the factor price,  F p  of each factor is equal to the marginal 
productivity of this factor: 
F F Y p ′ = .            ( 3 5 )  
Comparing the formulas (34) and (35), we come to the conclusion that the “Total 
Potential of Economic System” is described by the “Cost-function” of Economy, or by 
“Costs of entrepreneurs”, C , if optimizing condition (35) fulfils approximately: 
∑ ⋅ =
k
k F F p C
k             ( 3 6 )  
Let us consider economy with two production factors: the capital, K  and labor, L. Let r  
be factor-price of the capital and w be a wage rate. We have: 
Cr Kw L =⋅ + ⋅.           ( 3 7 )  
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.           ( 3 9 )  
The difference  YC Π ≡− is a net profit of economic system. Let us denotate net profit 




≡ .            ( 4 0 )  
 The following formula takes place provided that cost-function,  () CY , is a differentiable 






Const R C Y R
Y
′ =⋅ = ⋅ ;         ( 4 1 )  
where  m Y  and  m C  are output and costs in the point of maximum of function  () R z . 
The formula (41) means that the right line  ( ) Ym CCY Y ′ = ⋅  is a tangent to the chart of cost-




≡  gets the maximum 
value: 







Π ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ′ ≡= − = − = − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠
.      ( 4 2 )  
Consequently the value  max π  depends on properties of cost-function. We can suppose that 
cost-function vary insignificantly if the reviewed period is not too lengthy. We get the first 
important result: values  max π   must be identical in the all points of peak efficiency of the 
economic system,  max 1 RR =≈ . The maximum efficiency points are peaks of economic activity. 
We suppose that the profit after taxes is the index of net profit of economic system. Profits 
after taxes per output (= GNP) in three points of peak of economic activity in the United States, 
1929, 1941 and 1948, are equal [Table 1]: 
1929 π ≈ 8.3%;  1941 π ≈8.2%;  1947 48 π − ≈ 8.8%. 
Alvin H. Hansen in “Business Cycles and National Income” [10], giving the following 
figures  max 1929; 1947 48 π π − =≈ 8.1% (Table XXXI, p.561), notes: 
“Profits after taxes stood at the same level in relation to gross national product in 1947-48 as 
in the great boom of 1929”. [p. 562] 
“Probably something like this average ratio is necessary in a well-functioning private 
enterprise economy”. [p. 569] 
The reason of constancy of this correlation is stability of the cost-function of Economic 
System.  
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Entrepreneurs desire maximizing the total net profit and output having current costs, C . 
These “desired” levels of net profit, 
() desired Π  and of output, 










Π ⎛⎞ ==− ⎜⎟ ′ ⎝⎠
 as follows: 
( ) ( )
1
desired desired dt Y Const e ξ
− ⋅ Π− Π + ⋅ = ⋅ .        ( 4 3 )  
This equation springs out of evolution equation (10) if we take into account the formulas 
(30) and (38) – (41). The constant  1 Const  depends on initial conditions. Variable ξ  depends on 










.            ( 4 4 )  
 “Desired”  profit, 
() desired Π  and “desired” output, 




desired qC Π= ⋅ ;           ( 4 5 )  
( ) () max 1
desired Yq C =+ ⋅.          ( 4 6 )  
Equation (43) means that parameter  d  is the Rate of Decrease of distance between 
“desired” and “actual” total net profit in Economic System provided the fluctuations of 
parameters of this system are absent,  0 ξ = . 
All we have to do is define “conditions of realization” in economic system. For this 
purpose we shall substitute the definition (33) in evolution equation (11): 
Y U U ⋅ = ⋅ Λ + ν  .           ( 4 7 )  
This equation formally coincides with equation of capital accumulation if only we shall 
identify the parameter Λ  with depreciation rate, and parameter ν  with propensity to investment. 
However, the equation (47) has a more profound sense. It describes the process of accumulation 
of conditions in the system. 
The value U  may be identified with the fixed capital in a broad sense, including 
everything that constitutes the reach resources of the society, in this concept. This not is 
fixed capital in industries only, but also the funds of other non-economic structures: education, 
public health, state administration, and natural and social security systems.  
The efficiency of using of production factors, of course, depends on all of the listed 
components; however, the main constituent is industrial fixed capital. Therefore, as a first 
approximation, one may conclude: 
K U ≈ .            ( 4 8 )  











=⋅ ;          ( 5 0 )  
YR
Kz
Ρ≡ = .            ( 5 1 )  
Consequently in geometric terms productivity of the capital is equal to the tangent of 
angle of inclination of the radius-vector drawn in plane ( ) R z,  from the coordinate origin to the 
point of the current state of the system.  
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It can be seen from Figure 1 the drawing that when  0 χ > , the upper branch within some 
interval of point  0 z  practically merges (coincides) with the right line  R z z ⋅ = 0 . Consequently the 




=≈.           ( 5 2 )  
It means that productivity of the capital in fact does not change at this section of top 
branch of evolution curve. This fact underlies in the basis of acceleration mechanism. The value 
of productivity of the capital on the upper section of evolution curve in the small left-hand 












.          ( 5 3 )  
 According to data prepared by Robert M. Solow [26], this ratio in nonfarm industry in 
Economy of the United States was equal to  0.3 ≈  before the Great Crash of 1929 and it lifted by 
value  0.5 ≈  at the end of 1940’s. We shall show below, that the formula (53) is really true if we 
shall identify parameters ν ,  a ,  Λ  with the long-term rate of investment, rate of growth and 
depreciation rate respectively (with the mean values within very great time intervals) – Table 4. 
The shift of point  0 z  to the left from value  ( ) 0 before 1930 3.3 z ≈  to value  () 0 after 1930 2 z ≈  
corresponds to growth of long-term productivity of the capital  0 P  from  () 0 before 1930 0.3 P ≈  to 
value  () 0 since 1930 0.5 P ≈ . As a result of this shift, as can be seen from Figure 2 and Diagram 1, 
the crisis of 1930’s proved to be much more durable and severe.  
The shift of point  0 z  is a clue to understanding of regularities of the Great Depression of 
1930’s. Arvid Aulin in book “Origins of Economic Growth” [2] is indicating at the logistic law 
of growth of short-term productivity of the capital during 1933-1948 years. Just such form of 
functional dependence directly follows from (8), (9), (12), (33), (47) and (48). This is the process 
of adjustment of Economic System with respect to new long-term level of productivity of the 
capital. So long as the long-term rate of growth of output is constant then productivity of the 





νν ≡−= + Λ − ⋅= ⋅ −

.        ( 5 4 )  
Hysteresis cycles, as applied with respect to the economic system, means the cyclic 














~z.           ( 5 6 )  
 The phase of the system’s falling from the top evolutional branch to the lower one is 
expressed, according to (55), in drastic drop of net profits per unit output, π . Therefore, the 
phase of catastrophic jump downwards of economic system, 1→2 (Fig.1) corresponds to the 
crisis phase of economic cycle. During the collapse of the system the value z varies much less 
than the value R  (Table 1 and Diagram 1). Therefore the crisis means as well sharp reduction of 
short-term productivity of the capital, 
YR
Kz
= . After the fall of the system to the lower evolution 
branch short-term productivity of the capital grows initially, while the value z decreases 2→3 
(Figures 1-2 and Diagram 1). Then this is followed by jump to the upper branch, 3→4. On the  
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upper branch, 4→1, short-run productivity of the capital gradually decreases in value, while the 
value  z grows slowly, approaching  0 z . Then a new jump downward, 1→2, takes place as 
consequence of fluctuation of the point  0 z  and the cycle recur. Jumps upward and downward 
correspond to revival and recession (crisis) phases of the business cycle.  
Wesley C. Mitchell in His book “What Happens During Business Cycles?” [19], gave 
detailed quantitative description of different phases and Stages of “typical” business cycle on the 
basis of analysis of major volume of statistical information. He established that Segment-by-
Segment Average Rate of Change per Month in Reference Cycle changes very irregularly. This 
quantity changes quasi-gradually within Stages I-V and Stages VI-VIII but it leaps down within 
Stages V-VI and it leaps up within Stages VIII-I.  According to our hypothesis these jumps in 
Segment-by-Segment Average Rate of Change per Month in Reference Cycle correspond to jumps 
of Economic System from one evolution branch to another. We consequently can consider this 
Mitchell’ result as indirect confirmation of hypothesis of hysteresis cycles. Diagram 2 illustrates 
this conclusion. 
The other our statement concerns the dynamics of Economic System during 1930’s. We 
calculated values of quantities (55) and (56) in order to verify does the shift 
() ( ) 00 before 1930 since 1930 3.3 2 zz ≈⇒ ≈  exist or not actually?  It is evident that Diagram 1 made 
on the basis of data in Table 1 confirms our supposition with respect to shift of long-term 
productivity of the capital since the Great Crash of 1929. 
III.  The Great Depression of 1930-ies as evolution catastrophe of Economic 
System. Brief Survey of historical events and its interpretations. 
The striving to get maximum profit has always been a dominant factor of economic 
growth. Let us call this factor “economic egoism”. If the economic entities are numerous, their 
egoisms, colliding, limit each other. The egoism in such system is not only a condition of 
personal welfare growth, but also a force retaining the personal egoism in certain limits. 
The situation changes cardinally when each segment of the market appears under the 
influence of several strong economic entities that dictate particular rules of the game to all the 
remaining market participants. In such systems the selfish force becomes self-sufficing. The 
egoism of cross-influencing economic entities does not meet counteraction, and everything that 
lets one gain momentary profit is deemed to be "good" in this situation. The principal fault of 
such system is near-sightedness. The violation of the collegiality principle becomes a norm here, 
even the condition to maintain high growth rate. 
The economy of the United States by early thirties was the economy of this type. The 
prosperity of the twenties was sustained by the measures being each in fact the violation of the 
collegiality principle. The core of this infringement lay in the fact that some economic entities got 
rich at the expense of the others, whereas the others hardly made ends meet. The economically 
strong units dictated their rules to economically weak units. This economic inequality let one 
make profit and grow rich at the expense of others. The "strong" did not show any willingness to 
seek compromise; they even had no understanding that they needed that compromise themselves. 
We shall single out three basic forms of economic egoism:  
1.  Pressure of large business upon individual small producers. This pressure was 
especially noticeable for private farm economy.  
2.  The pressure of the proprietors on the workers, that resulted in considerable reduction 
of labour share in the national income in late twenties.  
3.  The pressure exerted by the United States on other countries that became their debtors 
after the First World War.  
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It is this infringement of collegiality principle that resulted finally in unprecedented 
depression that paralysed the national economy for nearly ten years. We do not mean to say that 
the violation of moral laws was the reason of crisis. There is not any direct relationship between 
morals and economy. However, it was the reluctance to see, put forward and timely solve the 
problems of economic inequality of different constituents of the economic system that was the 
main cause of profundity and duration of the crisis of 30-ies. Business is based on egoism and is 
beyond the sphere of morals; therefore it is the society that must see to observance of collegiality 
principle by means of laws or institutes. In the twenties a new reality emerged – the economy 
controlled by large corporations. This new economy needed a new social system objectively, that 
would restrict the economic egoism of corporations and solve the problems of inequality in due 
time. However, such system did not exist in the twenties. The problems were accumulating, got 
imposed on each other, without solution. Finally this accumulated burden of unsolved problems 
leads to crisis. 
The high level of investments in the twenties created a new economy extensively using 
new technologies. This new economy could provide the higher level of productivity of the 
capital, but to do that it was necessary to lower the propensity to investment (parameter ν ). 
This conclusion is the direct consequence of formula (53). Therefore, the principle of long-term 
accumulation entered into conflict with the principle of short-term accumulation. It was a 
contradiction between the long-term interest of the whole society and the short-term interest of a 
small bunch of investors. The high rate of investment negated itself. 
Below we shall briefly list the factors that in the twenties accounted for the long-term 
excess of rate of investment over the level required for normal development. The underlying 
basis of these factors was economic egoism of different constitutes of economic system. The 
most relevant reason of the boom was infringement of collegiality principle in the twenties. 
1.  Large business in the form of corporations dictated the price and conditions of sales 
to the other producers. The corporations established ungrounded high prices and go 
super profits. The reverse side was that the companies selling their goods in the 
competitive market, but buying the required means of production from suppliers - 
monopolists lost part of their profit. The monopolies and large corporations grew rich 
at the expense of dispersed individual manufacturers. 
Gardiner C. Means [16] at the annual meeting of the American Statistical Association in 
1934 stated: 
“…The last century has seen a steadily increasing shift from market coordination to 
administrative coordination… As a result of this shift from market to administration, the area of 
coordination remaining to the market has been greatly reduced while the increased bargaining power 
of the big administrative units has induced the counter concentration in the form of cooperative 
bargaining organizations, farm cooperatives, labor unions… thus reducing the number of separate 
units interacting though the market… Prices have become problems of administration” [13; p.30]. 
(In this part of the paper we refers to two collection of selections from different books devoted to the Great 
Depression:  Shannon, D. A., 1960,  The Great Depression [25] and Himmelberg, R. F., 1968,  The Great 
Depression and American capitalism [13]. First figure in square brackets correspond to the number of collection in 
reference list.) 
The prices fixed administratively mismatched the costs. These were rigidly fixed prices 
using which the corporations reduced the share of labour and expanded the share of profits. By 
the end of twenties these prices that lost the capacity to regulate the market started dominating in 
economy. 
“Very many of our wholesale prices are administrated”, Gardiner C. Means says,  
“administrated prices are to be found in a great many highly competitive industries… Inflexible 
administrated prices are a major factor in our economy. This is heightened when we add relative inflexibility 
of railroad and utility rates, or salaries and often of labor rates, of many commercial loan rates, and of  
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many government services…But ever in the … competitive industries such as automobiles, the 
rigidity of prices is evident while in the dispersed industries like farming… prices are extremely 
flexible…(1) Inflexible administrated prices are a major factor in our economy, (2) they constitute a 
serious impediment to balanced economic functioning, (3) they result primarily from and are 
inherent in economic concentration and modern industrial organization…” [13; p.29-30]. 
H.L. McCracken in 1938 in His paper [15] devoted to the influence of monopolies upon 
the crisis was noting: 
“…We do not live in a frictionless world of free competition and flexible price… Our 
modern economy is marked by frictions of many types, by rigid prices administered by government 
or business organizations sufficiently unified and powerful to control supply and regulate prices” 
[13; p. 34-35]. 
“Whereas one of the major functions of competition is to keep price related to cost the 
major purpose of monopoly is to break the connection between cost and price… Monopolistic 
competition tends to achieve equilibrium by holding prices relatively rigid and restricting the output 
to the demand which will be effective at the pre-determined price”. [13; p.35]  
The pressure exerted by big business told especially acutely on economic situation of 
private farm economies. The price discrimination of farms is the most striking example of 
economic inequality. Arthur A. Adams in 1932 [1] was writing: 
“The large business enterprises particularly in the fields of mining, manufacturing and trade 
through monopolies, cartels, and trade associations have been able in great measure to hold the 
prices of their products at relatively stable points in the face of an increasing output and lower 
costs… The farmers… partly because of the lack of joint ability to control output and the marketing 
of their products have little power to hold up the prices of their products. Producers’ control of the prices 
of one class of products and the lack of control by producers of another class of products have thrown the price system out 
of adjustment and have caused an unbalanced development of industry”. [13; p.18-19] 
The farmers’ position was disastrous in 1920-ies. Bernhard Ostrolenk in New York 
Times, September 25, 1932 [21] was writing: 
“The Most Superficial study of the statistics reveals that while industry reached a new peak of 
prosperity between 1920 and 1929, the farmer met with one financial setback after another, that he 
was becoming poorer and poorer, that the disaster of 1920 was followed by an even greater financial 
catastrophe in 1930”. [25; p.17] 
The level of farm products prices was set too low as compared with the industrial products 
price level. This caused serious migration of the rural population. The industrialisation of 
America in the twenties took place to a great extent at the farmers’ expense. It was based on the 
influx of cheap labour and low prices for raw materials and staple foodstuffs. In this sense the 
city grew rich at the expense of agriculture. 
As Arthur A. Adams states: 
“The small purchasing power of the farming population (due to relatively low prices of 
agricultural products) since 1920 has adversely affected the demand for consumers’ goods in the 
United States. In spite of this fact, however, the low prices of agricultural products were one of the forces upon 
which our great industrial expansion (1922-29) fed. The relatively low prices of agricultural products gave 
manufacturers cheaper raw materials and relieved them of stronger pressure for increases in wages of 
workers. Low agricultural prices also provided cheap food for the urban population, adding to their relative power to 
purchase other commodities” [13; p.17-18]. 
 Nearly all economists agree that it is the prices fixed in the administrative way, not able 
to regulate the market that proved to be one of the causes of the crisis of thirties.  
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“The most significance of these inflexible prices lies in their disruptive effect on the functioning of our economy”, 
Gardiner C. Means says, “if all prices had been flexible it is doubtful if we would have had a 
serious depression after the stock crash of 1929. Instead of producing lower prices, the drop demand 
produces a drop in sales and in production. Workers and machines are thrown out of use and both 
owners and workers have less to spend, thus amplifying the original drop in demand. In this manner, 
rigid prices can expand an initial small fluctuation of industrial activity into a cataclysmic depression” [13; p.29]. 
“I agree”, Arthur Adams writes, “with those who hold that both individual prices and the 
system of prices have lost some the elasticity they used to have, and that this change has contributed 
to our present difficulties… I believe that… if prices had generally followed the lead of declining 
costs, we should have had today only a very mild business depression, or, no at all, instead of the 
very severe one we now have” [13; p.18]. 
2.  The privileged position of the United States as compared with the other countries 
that was established after the First World War let it for a considerable time to sustain the 
extremely favourable trade balance. The United States becomes a world creditor. This 
enabled it to get huge additional income. The country on the whole grew rich at the 
expense of other countries. The countries - debtors were either to expand their export or 
pay with gold or borrow new loans.  
Such policy eventually disturbed the balance on the world financial and commodity 
markets that got established after the War. The change in the world prices distorted the price 
structure within the country. The first person that referred to interrelation between the crisis and 
the foreign policy pursued was Ambrose W. Benkert, prominent member of the New York State 
Chamber of Commerce. He was writing in 1933 in his pamphlet “How to Restore Values…” [3]: 
“It is evident that the existing paralysis of business in the United States is due primarily to a 
break down of fair price interrelationships among commodities, raw materials, manufactured goods 
and services… The present price level of commodities and raw materials in contrast with the price 
level of essential services as expressed in taxes, interest and maturing debts, rents, transportation and 
utility rates… Many commodity and raw material prices… are at the lowest level in a century. 
Essential services depending on contract or government fixation still enjoy the peak price level of 
recent years… What has caused the present disparity in prices? … 
During the war the United States had changed from a debtor to a preponderant creditor 
nation. During the past-war decade … most of the civilized nations of the world became our 
debtors… Foreign nations were therefore compelled to curtail imports and expand exports to 
provide funds for service charges on these external loans… In many of these countries programs 
were initiated to reduce the quantity of commodities used by their own populations in order to have 
a greater supply for export and at the same time their own manufactures were stimulated so as to 
reduce imports and provide additional exports to equalize their balance of payments… These 
policies initiated even before the crash of 1929, started a worldwide downward trend of commodity 
prices…” and “…compelled our foreign debtor nations to bid for gold… This procedure… broke 
down world price levels and flooded all markets with cheaper and cheaper goods… Our price level 
for commodities, raw materials and other goods in world competition… declined proportionately. 
Our domestic price levels for services and goods depending on contract, governmental fixation, 
usage, trade combinations, etc., remained where they were. Thus was brought about the disparity in 
price levels within our own country” [13; p.1-3]. 
This is how Robert A. Gordon in book “Business Fluctuations”, 1952 [8] describes the 
crash of the “debt bondage” policy carried out in the twenties. 
 “During the First World War, the United States became a creditor of international account. 
In the decade following, the surplus of exports over imports had paid the interest and principal on 
loans from Europe continued. The high tariffs, which restricted imports and helped to create this 
surplus of exports, remained… Other countries, which were buying more than they sold, and had  
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debt payments to make in addition, had somehow to find the means for making up the deficit in 
their transactions with United States. 
During most of the twenties the difference was covered by cash – i.e., gold payments to the 
United States – and by new private loans by the United States to other countries. Most of the loans 
were to governments… and a large proportion were to Germany and Central and South America… 
Countries could not cover their adverse trade balance with the United States with increased payments 
of gold… This meant that they had either to increase their exports to the United States or reduce 
their imports or default on their past loans… Accordingly, debts, including war debts, went into 
default and there was a precipitate fall in American exports… It contributed to the general distress 
and was especially hard on farmers” [13; p.92-93]. 
3.  The redistribution of national income to the benefit of private property that took place in 
the twenties was the direct consequence of the administrative pricing policy. This 
eventually disrupted the demand for consumer goods artificially maintained by means of 
the crediting system (instalment buying). Those who lived on income from property 
grew relatively rich at the expense of those who earned by their labour.  
Arthur A. Adams was writing: 
“The pursuit of profits was the underlying incentive which brought into action the forces 
which increased our power of production. From the standpoint of production of economic goods 
and services, we have today, the most effective industrial system the world has been seen. 
But in this system one outstanding weakness is now apparent. We have failed to develop effective 
methods of the distribution of money income to the mass of consumers. The money income received by 
consumers is not sufficiently large to enable them to purchase at prevailing prices the consumers’ 
goods and services, which our economic system produces. This outstanding weakness is a result largely of 
the desire for high profits on the part of managers”. [13; p.19] 
“From 1923 to 1929 our economic system was trough out of balance. During this period we 
increased our power to produce goods, especially per worker, while at the same time the distribution 
of the current money income or power to purchase these goods became more unequal and 
maladjusted. This lack of balance was overcome temporarily through the unsound use of bank credit 
in creating buying power and therefore the demand for goods. The artificial prosperity thus 
generated could not last forever. The maladjustment between the production of goods and the 
distribution of income finally showed itself in the present depression” [13; p.15]. 
John Kenneth Galbraith in book “The Great Crash, 1929”, [7] notes: 
“In 1929… 5% of the population with the highest incomes received approximately one third 
of all personal income. The proportion of personal income received in the form of interest, 
dividends, and rent… was about twice as great as in the years following the Second World War. This 
highly unequal income distribution meant that the economy was depend on a high level of 
investment.” [13; p.90] 
The reason of growth of the share of property in the national income was not only excess 
profit of corporations backed by the system of administratively fixed prices, but also the 
speculative boom at the end of the twenties that generated a surge of frauds and swindles. 
“American enterprise in the twenties”, John Galbraith writes, “had opened its hospitable 
arms to an exceptional number of promoters, gaffers, swindlers, impostors, and frauds” [13; p.91] 
The Banking Act of 1933; Securities Act of 1933; and Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 that drastically restricted the possibility of financial manipulations was the first step 
undertaken by the government as soon as it recovered from the crisis. 
Summing up, we may agree with John Kenneth Galbraith: 
“In 1929… the economy was fundamentally unsound”. [13; p.90] 
 Let us list the principal items of this “disease” once again:  
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1.  The big business made profit at the expense of non-united dispersed manufacturers. 
2.  The city prospered at the expense of agriculture. 
3.  The country in general made profit for account of other countries. 
4. The proprietary class appropriated the increasing part of national income by 
reducing the share paying for the labour.  
The economic system suffered from the excessive selfishness. The crisis of the 30-ies 
was the direct consequence of infringement of collegiality principle in the twenties. In this sense 
the catastrophe that took place was of religious and moral character. The respected priest Nikolay 
Serbsky (Николай Сербский) [23] characterizes the events of that time in one of his letters in 
the following way: 
“Crisis” is a Greek word (χρισισ); it means “court” in translation… In earlier times the 
Europeans, if struck by misfortune, used the word “court”… Now the word court is substituted by 
the word “crisis”… You ask about the cause of the present crisis, or the God’s judgement? The 
cause is always the same – … apostasy from God… Lord used modern instruments to bring 
contemporary people to reason. He struck a blow on banks, stock exchanges and the whole financial 
system. He overturned the tables of moneychangers all over the world, as He once did in the 
Jerusalem Temple. He spread unheard-of panic among the dealers and moneychangers. He disturbed 
everything, overthrew, confused, and aroused fear…” [p. 17]. 
Below we present the evidence of contemporaries of those events, the economists, well-
known political figures and ordinary people. It was a catastrophe, and most contemporaries 
treated what was happening exactly as a catastrophe. Everything the people lived for collapsed. 
David A. Shannon, the editor of collected articles “The Great Depression” [25],  in 1961, 
assesses the events of those years like this: 
“…The Great Depression was a traumatic experience. It was all the more traumatic because 
the immediately preceding years had been quite comfortable once on the whole and the American 
mood had been, unusually optimistic. During the 1920’ business and political leaders spoke of the 
New Era… An ever-expanding economy, full employment, and the elimination of poverty were 
permanent futures, many believed, of the New Era” [25; p. IX]. 
 In the twenties the business was prospering, the incomes were growing, and nothing 
foreboded the thunderstorm. John Kenneth Galbraith characterizes the economic situation on 
the eve of the crisis this way: 
“In 1929 the labor force was not tired, it could have continued to produce indefinitely at the 
best 1929 rate. The capital plant of the country was not depleted. In the proceeding years of 
prosperity, plant had been renewed and improved. In fact, depletion of the capital plant occurred 
during the ensuring years of idleness when new investment was sharply curtailed. Raw materials in 
1929 were ample for the current rate of production. Entrepreneurs were never more eupeptic. 
Obviously if men, materials, plant and management were all capable of continued and even enlarged 
exertions a refreshing pause was not necessary” [13; p.88]. 
 Robert A. Gordon in his detailed research [8] notes the following: 
“From 1923 though 1929, business remained at a high level and tended to increase still 
further… We thus have a picture of a prolonged investment boom, which supported a steady 
expansion in incomes and consumers’ demand and at same time provided the enlarged capacity 
necessary to meet the rising demand for goods and services” [13; p.104]. 
“There was overinvestment in the late 1920’s in the sense that capacity... had been expanding 
at a rate that could not be indefinitely maintained… The chief immediate cause of the downturn, 
then, was probably the impact of “partial overinvestment” on business expectations. This, however, is 
not sufficient to account for the length or severity of the depression…” [13; p.108].  
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 There is not so far a common opinion among the economists about the reasons that 
engendered this stagnation in economy, unheard-of before in terms of gravity and duration, which 
stagnation being unusual already by the fact that it took place without any visible external 
reasons: there was no drought or wars or any natural calamities or social cataclysms. 
According to Arthur B. Adams: 
“The economic conditions which led up to the depression were somewhat similar to those 
which have led up to other business depressions: were increase in production, increase in trade, and 
considerable inflation in bank credit” [13; p.15]. 
“But unlike these other occasions,” John Kenneth Galbraith says, “in 1929 the recession 
continued and continued and got violently worse. This is unique feature of the 1929 experience. This 
is what we need really to understand” [13; p.90]. 
“What… are plausible causes of the depression,” he asks, “the task of answering can be 
simplified somewhat by dividing the problem into two parts. First there is the question of why 
economic activity turned down in 1929. Second there is the vastly more important question of why, having 
started down, on this unhappy occasion it went down and down and down and remained low for a full decade” [13; 
p.89]. 
Calling the events of 1930-ies a “catastrophe that paralyzed America for more than a 
decade”, David A. Shannon offers a mathematically precise definition of this phenomenon. 
The crisis of 30-ies was in fact a catastrophe in mathematical terms, a jump of the 
system from the upper evolution branch to the lower evolution branch. However, this time 
the jump was accompanied by a rapid growth of long-term productivity of the capital. This 
resulted in a sharp left-shift of point  0 z , following which the crisis became much more grave and 
lengthy (Fig.2). 
The growth of long-term productivity of the capital was being prepared for a long time 
and was a direct consequence of industrialisation of the twenties. However, the adaptation of the 
system to new level of productivity of the capital supposing the reduction of long-term propensity 
to investment (formula (53)), contradicted to the interest of those who lived at the expense of that 
excessive of investment rate. 
The impetuosity and pace of shift of the point  0 z  after the “Black Tuesday” is the direct 
consequence of the situation when the force maintaining the position of that point lost its effect, 
and the system was able to realise the structural change that had matured for a long time. 
Robert A. Gordon, expressing the widespread point of view of later economists 
regarding the events of those years, relates the depression directly with the preceding boom of the 
twenties: 
“Investment opportunities (30
th) were restricted then because they had been so thoroughly 
exploited in the 1920’s and because the severity of the financial liquidation after 1929 led 
businessmen and investors to view with a jaundiced eye the opportunities that were available” [13; 
p.110]. 
 “Black Tuesday” changed the long-term expectations radically. The subjective source of 
excess of propensity to investment over the level that would match new, higher long-term 
productivity of the capital ceased to exist. There appeared a possibility to adjust the economic 
system to this new level of long-term productivity of the capital. However, to make this level 
working, it was necessary to eliminate the disproportion that emerged in the twenties, of 
distribution of the national income between the labour and property. Roosevelt’s policy of New 
Deal was the system of measures that managed to solve this problem. 
Joseph A. Schumpeter in His book “Business Cycles”, 1939 [24] writes: 
“Objectively” – i.e. irrespectively of intentions harbored by any individuals – they (investors) 
amounted to systematic attack on investment opportunity all round: it was frontally attacked by 
direct reduction of revenues – or the operative part of total net revenues – though taxation, which  
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would have been only the more effective if there really had been also an inherent tendency for 
investment opportunity to shrink; simultaneously, it was attacked in the rear by increasing costs; and 
both attacks were supplemented by a third – the attack on those traditional methods of management, 
pricing, and financing in the sphere of “big business”, which were associated with the latter’s 
emergence and successes” [13; p.67]. 
  The crisis of the 30-ies started as a normal “jump off” of the system with the top 
evolution branch of the hysteresis cycle to the lower branch. Mathematically, such jumps 
underlying the business cycles, according to our hypothesis, represent regularly occurring micro-
catastrophes by means of which the system is renewed and progresses. However this time the 
jump downwards turned out to be a giddy drop, a catastrophe in full sense of this word. 
 David A. Shannon [25] describes the events of that time as follows: 
“After several months of depression America was indeed a place turned topsy-turvy. Even 
the surface appearance of the cites changed. Former bond salesmen were on the sidewalks trying to 
sell apples. Former clerks roamed the business districts in attempts to make a living by shining shoes. 
Unemployed and homeless men welcomed arrests for vagrancy and the warmth and food to be had 
in jail. Over a hundred thousand American workers applied for jobs in the Soviet Union. Shanty 
towns appeared in and around the industrial cities, and the inhabitants of these housing 
developments born desperation bitterly named them for the President of the United States” [25; 
p.1]. 
“It is difficult to say whether the unemployed urban worker or the farmer suffered the more 
from the depression” [25; p.16]. 
“Forlorn, down-and-out men shuffled hopeless through bread lines” [25; p. IX]. 
“Industrial workers and farmers dearly suffered more from want during the depression than 
other economic groups. Nevertheless, the deprivations of middle-class families were serious. Most 
people who made their living from their invested capital, from their business, or from their 
professional work did not go hungry – although some did – but many lost a considerable part of 
their fortune and took a major loss of income” [25; p.72] 
 New York Times, June 5, 1932 was writing: 
“Darwin’s theory that man can adopt himself to almost any new environment is being 
illustrated, in this days of economic change, by thousands of New Yorkers who have discovered new 
ways to live and new ways to earn a living since their formerly placid lives were thrown into chaos by 
unemployment or kindred exigencies” [25; p.10]. 
John Kenneth Galbraith characterizing the general atmosphere of 1930-ies as follows: 
“When the misfortune had struck, the attitudes of the time kept anything from being done 
about it. This, perhaps, was the most disconcerting feature of all. Some people were hungry in 1930 
and 1931 and 1932. Others were tortured by the fear that they might go hungry. Yet others suffered 
the agony of the descent from the honor and respectability that goes with income into poverty. And 
still others feared that they would be next. Meanwhile everyone suffered from a sense of utter hopelessness” [13; 
p.95] 
“In 1931 and 1932, - David A. Shannon was writing – talk of social revolution become 
common. Surely though thousands of people the dispossessed and the hungry will revolt against the 
government and the economic system that had brought them to their desperate situation. But no 
revolution came. At least there was no revolution such as many anticipated, with rioting, blood in the 
gutters and violent overthrow of government. Instead a majority of the electorate switched its 
allegiance from the party of Herbert Hoover to the party of Franklin Delano Roosevelt” [25; p. X]. 
 The striving to solve the problems by common efforts prevailed over the desire to find 
the culprits. Instead of revolution a change of power typical for a democratic country took place. 
Roosevelt’ New Deal policies withdrew the economy from crisis. The economists assess the  
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importance of this policy in the recovery process in a different way. However, despite the 
shortcomings of specific acts, New Deal policies objectively promoted withdrawal from crisis.  
It was a rigid policy of restricting of economic egoism: introduction of state control over 
the bond and real market activity (The Banking and Securities Acts of 1933 and Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934), price and wage rates monitoring (National Industrial Recovery Act 
(June, 1933) – NIRA and latter, National Labor Relation Act (Jule, 1935); Public Utility Act of 
1935), and raising taxes on corporate profit. John Chamberlain, a journalist and commentator 
on the economic and political scene, in his book “The Enterprising Americans: A Business 
History of the United States”, 1963 [4] was writing: 
“The first important domestic creation the New Deal, the NRA, was a total abnegation of 
the competitive market economy… With its price-fixing and market-allocating codes the NRA was a 
denial of the free system… Businessmen came to ask themselves whether Roosevelt really 
understood a system where the hope of profit sparks expansion and investment” [25; p.96]. 
The policy of redistribution of national income pursued by the government made it 
possible to sharply increase the share of labor. John Chamberlain gives the following figures: 
 “… Money wage rates in manufacturing advanced some 43 per cent between 1933 and 1939 
and real wages by an extraordinary 34 per cent… Some of this rise was no doubt to be expected in a 
period of partial recovery but much of it followed out of government-blessed wage boosts from an 
unprecedented surge of union organization” [24; p.97]. 
Relief, Housing and Social Security Programs (NIRA, Emergency Relief Act of 1932, 
National Housing Act of 1934; Social Security Act of 1935), Public Works, government 
intervention “for getting agriculture into better balance with the rest of the economy” (Soil 
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938) 
and other measures taken by the government made it possible to relax the social tension. It was a 
policy of moderate socialist reforms, mild expropriation of the share of income of the society’s 
richest section.  
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934 had explained the essence of New Deal as follows: 
“What we seek is balance in our economic system – balance between agriculture and 
industry and balance between the wage earner, the employer, and the consumer” [6; p.199]. 
One may say that the basis of this wise policy was the collegiality principle.  
It is understandable that the bourgeoisie did not like these measures, but it was compelled 
to agree to them, being afraid to lose everything otherwise. In judgement of Joseph A. 
Schumpeter [24]: 
“… Behind these measures, administrative acts, and anticipations there is something much 
more fundamental, viz., an attitude hostile to the industrial bourgeoisie… They (businessmen) are 
not only, but they feel threatened” [13; p.68]. 
The willingness to find reasonable compromise that would suit all the parties, and the 
decisive government measures to restrict the economic egoism in society made it possible to 
stabilize the situation in the country. 
The timely return to collegiality principle in politics helped to prevent the revolution and 
withdraw the country from chaos. According to David A. Shannon: 
“Roosevelt and his party succeeded in partially alleviating the personal distress of the Great 
Depression and in effecting a partial economic recovery” [25; p. X]. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938 in his public speech on the radio expressed the close 
relationship of the politics pursued by him with collegiality principle this way:  
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“No doubt you will be told that the Government spending program of the past five years did 
not cause the increase in our national income… That is true in part, for the Government spent only 
a small part of the total. But Government spending acted as trigger to set off private activity… 
The Government contribution of land that we once made to business was the land of all the 
people. And the Government contribution of money, which we now make to business ultimately, 
comes out of the labor of all the people. It is therefore, only sound morality, as well as a sound 
distribution of buying power, that the benefits of the prosperity coming from this use of the money 
of all the people should be distributed among all the people – at the bottom as well as at the top” 
[25; p.27]. 
  The events after the Great Crash at the New York’ Stock Exchange, the “Black 
Tuesday”, as this unfortunate day will be called later, developed sweepingly. Let us note just 
some of the facts, illustrating them with statistical data. 
The next day after the collapse a regular issue of New York Times was released with a 
bombastic title: “Worst Stock Crash stemmed by banks. 12,894,650 – Share Day Swamps Market 
Leaders Confer, Find Conditions Sound”: 
“The most disastrous decline in the biggest and broadest stock market at history… The total 
losses cannot be accurately calculated because of the large number of markets and the thousands of 
securities not listed on any exchange. However, they were staggering, running into billions of dollars” 
[25; p.2]. 
The landslide of shares monstrous in its scale was, naturally, a serious blow on the 
economy. However, some cases of large-scale share collapse are known to have happened before; 
this has always seriously affected the economic activity, but with time the real economy used to 
adjust to the changes in the stock market. Therefore no one could expect that the Wall Street 
collapse would cause such consequences. 
On the day of crash, October 24, five most influential bankers after an emergency meeting 
at the office of J.P. Morgan & Co., made a statement: 
“… That the market smash has been caused by technical rather than fundamental 
consideration and that many sound stocks are selling too low” [25; p.2]. 
And in 6 days New York Times informed that: 
“Stock Prices virtually collapsed yesterday, swept downward with gigantic losses in the most 
disastrous trading day in the stock market’s history” [25; p.4]. 
 The economic indices of 1929 did not cause any serious anxiousness. Actually, there 
were some indicators of weakening of business activity, like John Kenneth Galbraith states, for 
instance: 
“Federal Reserve indexes of industrial activity and of factory production… reached a peak in 
June. They then turned down and continued to decline throughout the rest of the year…The turning 
point in other indicators – factory payrolls, freight-car loadings and department store sales – came 
later, and it was October or after before the trend in all of them was clearly down… the summer of 
1929 marked the beginning of the familiar inventory recession” [13; p.89]. 
  However on the whole the economy seemed to be stable. Broadus Mitchell, a 
distinguished economic historian in book  “Depression Decade: From New Era through New 
Deal, 1929-1941” [17] informs that shortly before the stock-exchange crash: 
 “The White House reported the President as considering “that business could look forward 
to the coming year with greater assurance”. H. Booth, president of the Merchants’ Association of 
New York, saw “no fundamental reason why business should not find itself again on the upgrade 
early in 1930…” [25; p.5]. 
The socially reputable persons did not believe in a possibility of a serious crisis and 
reassured the people claiming that nothing serious had taken place.  
20 
According to Broadus Mitchell [17]: 
“The Guaranty Trust Company of New York expressed qualified hope: “Although there is 
no failure to appreciate the importance of the collapse of stock prices as an influence on general 
business or to ignore the historical fact that such a collapse has almost invariably been followed by a 
major business recession, emphasis has… been placed on certain fundamental differences between 
the conditions that exist at present and these that have usually been witnessed at similar times in 
past” [25; p.5]. 
 However, contrary to all forecasts, this time events developed according to a different 
script. The economy not only recovered after a shock, but, despite all forecasts, assurance and 
conjuration kept on falling. 
According to David A. Shannon [25]: 
“The Wall Street debacle directly and immediately affected only a relatively small part of the 
American population, but a new and dismal era had began. Despite the assurance – or incantations – 
of business and political leaders that the stock market crash did not reflect upon the health of the 
economy in general, it was not long before almost every indication of the nation’s economic welfare 
showed trouble” [25; p.1]. 
 The people did not realise immediately that the share drop that happened this time was an 
event principally different from what took place ever before. They did not realise at once that the 
downfall of the stock market was a "disturbance" of the economic system after which it 
could not return to its former state.  
John Kenneth Galbraith in His book [7] notes: 
“On the whole, the great stock market crash can be more readily explained than the 
depression that followed it. And among the problems involved in assessing the causes of 
depression none is more intractable than the responsibility to be assigned to the stock market crash. 
Economics still does not allow final answers on these matters… After the Great Crash came the 
Great Depression which lasted, with varying severity, for ten years… It is easier to account for the 
boom and crash in the market than to explain their bearing on the depression, which followed. The 
causes of the Great Depression are still far from certain” [13; p.86-87]. 
Let us formulate once again our interpretation of the crisis of the 30-ies. Its main 
peculiarity lay in the fact that the normal recession was this time drastically strengthened by 
considerable and fast change of the system parameters, namely, sharp reduction of value  0 z.  
This considerable reduction was a consequence of two reasons: 1) growth of long-term 
productivity of the capital during the twenties and 2) excess of propensity to investment in this 
period over the level that would match this new, higher long-term productivity of the capital.  
The first to react to the events of the Tuesday was the banking system closely connected 
with the stock market. 
According to David A. Shannon [25]: 
“Banks began to fail at an alarming rate” [p. IX]. 
“…More than 5,000 banks closed their doors in the three years, 1930-1932” [p.72]. 
Harold U. Faulkner in His book “Labor in America” [6], informs: 
“In the two years, 1930-31, 3,750 banks failed” [p.195]. 
William Greenleaf, in book “American Economic Development Since 1860”, [9] 
describes the banking system collapse as follows: 
“The real run on the American banks can be dated from the failure of the Bank of the United 
States in New York in December, 1930. From that time… failures continued at an increasing rate… 
The R.F.C. (Reconstruction Finance Corporation, based in January 1932) succeeded in slackening the  
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pace of failures, though they continued throughout 1932 at the average rate of 40 banks and $2 
million of deposits every each… Towards the end of the year the final collapse began. The first state 
moratorium was declared on October 31
st; the Detroit banks closed on February 14, 1933, and 
within three weeks the bank “holiday’ had spread to every state in the Union” [p.193-194]. 
Default hit the real economy as well by sharp fall of demand for investment goods. 
According to John Kenneth Galbraith [7]: 
“The collapse in securities values affected in the first instance the wealthy and the well-to-do. 
But… in the world of 1929 this was a vital group. The members disposed of a large proportion of 
the consumer income; they were the source of a lion’s share of personal saving and investment. 
Anything that struck of the spending or investment by this group would of necessity have broad 
effects on expenditure and income in the economy at large. Precisely such a blow was struck by the 
stock market crash…” [13; p.95]. 
The strong dependence of economy on the demand for investment goods of the most well-
to-do section of the population generated the first surge of reduction in the industrial output. 
As David A. Shannon [25] notes: 
“The Wall Street panic triggered a general collapse. Within only a few months unemployment 
becomes a serious problem” [p. IX]. 
 The below data regarding unemployment were taken from the article by Paul Webbink, 
published in Proceedings of the American Economic Association, February, 1941 [28].  
“Within a few months after the stock market collapse of October, 1929, unemployment had 
been catapulted from its status of a vague worry to be considered some future day into position of 
one of the country’s foremost preoccupation. Unemployment increased steadily… from the fall of 
1929 to the spring of 1933” [25; p.6]. 
According to Paul Webbink, the unemployment grew twofold from March 1930 to 
March 1931, and the next year - by 50 more percent. By March 1932 the unemployment reached 
by different estimates from 11,250,000 to 12,500,000. The peak of unemployment was in winter 
1932-1933. Different sources give different figures. According to Robert Nathan, by March 1933 
the country had 13,577,000 unemployed. According to National Industrial Conference Board, the 
number of unemployed at that moment was 14,586,000. American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations provide still greater values - 15,389,000 and 16,000,000 
respectively. 
According to John Kenneth Galbraith [7]: 
“In 1933 nearly thirteen million were out of work, or about one in every four in the labor 
force” [13; p.86]. 
 The drop in production reached catastrophic dimensions. The curtailment of production 
entailed the fall in prices, reduction of hourly wages of industrial workers and employees’ 
salaries. 
“In 1933,” John Kenneth Galbraith states, “GNP… was nearly a third less than in 1929. 
Not until 1937 did the physical volume of production recover to the levels of 1929, and then it 
promptly slipped back again. Until 1941 the dollar value of production remained below 1929. 
Between 1930 and 1940 only once, in 1937, did the average number unemployed during the year 
drop below eight million” [13; p.86]. 
We could proceed with adducing another facts and figures describing the huge catastrophe 
that happened in America in the thirties. The scope of the tragedy may be evidenced by the 
figures of increment of population given by Alvin H. Hansen in book “Business Cycles and 
National Income” [10; p.76]:  
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Decade    Increase in population 







It is clear that the “Black Tuesday” engendered that catastrophe, but was not its cause. 
The cause, as we already mentioned, was infringement of the collegiality principle in the 
twenties. This infringement resulted in a gap between the potential and actual productivity of 
capital. In the twenties this gap was growing step-by-step. To release this higher productivity 
of the capital, it was necessary to cut down the rate of investment existing in the twenties, 
which was sustained at a high level for a long time, ensuring welfare of the most prosperous 
section of the society. 
The collapse was the incitement that caused the drop of the system from the upper branch 
to the lower one. In this sense it was that very fluctuation that underlies the jumps of the 
hysteresis cycle. But the Collapse was a blow to expectations as well, which resulted in a sharp 
left-shift of the point  0 z , which in its turn became the reason of as unusual depth and duration of 
this crisis. 
The high rate of investment was sustained in the twenties by infringing collegiality 
principle that we have already spoke about: (1) privileged financial position of the country in the 
world, (2) low share of labour in the national income, (3) disproportion of prices for the products 
of big business and individual dispersed producer, (4) high prices for the products of big 
business, not matching the real costs. 
If the investment rate had lowered smoothly in the twenties within several cycles, no 
Great Depression would take place at all. The economy would continuously shift to a new 
level of productivity of the capital. Each separate crisis would be somewhat more profound, but 
on the whole the transition would be less painful. However, such route demanded restriction of 
economic egoism on the part of the society. The social system that would take the role of such 
restricting executor was not yet built in the twenties.  
Of course the given interpretation of events is only a hypothesis. But this hypothesis is in 
accord with the factual data, both in terms of quality and quantity. Now we proceed to the 
statistical verification of this hypothesis. 
IV.  Verification of hypothesis of hysteresis loops as applied to business 
cycles of Economic System. 
The in-depth study of the factual data is beyond the frameworks of this article. So we shall 
cite just several results. 
We have attempted to verify two statements: (1) hypothesis of evolution cycles as applied 
to economic system, and (2) hypothesis, which explains the Great Depression of 1930-ies as a 
result of sharp reduction of value  0 z . 
Hypothesis of evolution hysteresis cycles as applied to economic system, means:  
(1) Existence of jumps upward and downward in dynamics of a business cycle. As we 
already mentioned (see part 2 of this paper), Segment-by-Segment Average Rate of 
Change per Month in Reference Cycle data prepared by Wesley C. Mitchell and 
represented in His book “What Happens During Business Cycles”, [19] confirm this 
property of hysteresis cycles (Diagram 2).  
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It is evident that sharp jumps from one evolution branch to another one must be shorter in general 
than the stages of continuous graduall evolution of a System along these branches.  Consequently 
we can suppose that duration of recession (jump downward, 1→2) and revival (jump upward, 
3→4),  less than duration of two other phases of business cycle: depression ( 2→3) and 
prosperity (4→1). Mitchell’ data (in particularly Diagram 2) confirm this property. 
Yet in 1928, in His book “Business Cycles. The Problems and Its Setting”, Wesley C. 
Mitchell estimated the duration of the different phases of a business cycle as follows: 
“…The phases of recession and revival are relatively brief. Put together, they account 
for only one-quarter of the duration of business cycles on the average. On the remaining three 
quarters, the prosperous phase occupies a somewhat longer time, than the phase of 
depression. But the ratio of months of prosperity to months of depression varies widely from 
country to country, and within any country it varies widely from cycle to cycle” [18; p.420]. 
Wesley Mitchell in this book refers to research of Willard L. Thorp, “Business Annals”, 
1926. Table 28 on page 408 contains figures based on Thorp’ results. Relative duration of 
different phases of business cycles (as a percent of duration of a cycle) calculated on the basis of 
investigation of cycles in seventeen countries during 1890-1925 is equal: 39.3% - for prosperity 
phase, 23.9% - for both recession and revival phases and, 36.8% - for depression phase. 
(2) The smaller fluctuations of quantities  0 z δ  and  1 z δ , the longer is hysteresis cycle. This 
prolongation of cycle takes place generally owing to prolongation of prosperous phase 
4→1 since duration of the all other phases of hysteresis cycle is limited. Consequently 
we can suppose that prosperous phase of typical business cycle (4→1) must be 
longer than depression phase of one (2→3) an average. This conclusion is 
confirmed by researches of Willard L. Thorp and Wesley C. Mitchell (see last 
citation). 
(3)  The other very interesting result consists in prolongation of  depression phase 
provided that the recession is accompanied by decreasing of value  0 z  - the case 
analogous to the Great Depression of 1930’s. It is evident that Great Depression is not 
only cycle in a history, which accompanied by sharp reduction of long-term capital 
coefficient,  0 z . We can suppose that such cycles be among the long cycles. 
Consequently investigation of long cycles must reveal some prolongation of 
depression phase relatively of a prosperous phase. 
Willard L. Thorp’ investigation of long cycles, about which Wesley C. Mitchell mentions 
in His “Business Cycles. The Problems and Its Setting”, confirms this our supposition: 
“Dr. Thorp”, Wesley C. Mitchell writes, “has made a special examination of these long 
cycles… His results appear in Table 31… The average phase of depression in these long cycles is 
nearly a year longer than the average phase of prosperity” [18; p.411-412]. 
(4) Finally, let us mark yet one important property of hysteresis cycles with fluctuating 
limiting points. Duration of hysteresis cycle is a random variable. Consequently 
statistical analysis must give some frequency distribution function of durations of 
cycle. Wesley C. Mitchell in “Business Cycles” proved that such frequency 
distribution function exists actually. His Chart 24 illustrates this frequency distribution 
function by means of different selections of data. He supposed that it is lognormal 
distribution. 
We resume. Wesley C. Mitchell’ investigation of business cycles qualitatively confirms 
the hypothesis of hysteresis business cycles (that is identification of evolution hysteresis loops 
with business cycles).  
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Let us consider some quantitative results of Method of Systems Potential as applied to 




















≡ .            ( 4 0 )  
We supposed that Π is Profits after Taxes; K - is Employed Capital; Y - is the Gross 
National Product.  
Four source of data were used: 
1. Summary National Income and Product Series: Annually, 1929-89 [27]; 
2. Moore G. H., 1961, “Business Cycle Indicators” [20]; 
3. Kendrick J.W., 1961, “Productivity Trends in the United States” [14] 
4. Solow, R.M., 1957, “Technical Change and production function” [26]. 
Notes in our Tables 1-5 contain the all-necessary information with respect to sources of 
data and calculations. Data before 1929 in Table 1 was taken from Moore’ manuscript [20]; data 
since 1928 in this Table – from Summary [27]. Productivity of Employed Capital in Nonfarm 
Industry was calculated on the basis of data from Solow’ paper [26]. Table 1 contains the results 
of R  and z calculations by means of the formulas (40), (49) and (50).   
We supposed at first that  1 Const =  (such supposition means that we do not take into 
account the presence of fluctuations) and calculated values, R  and z. Regression analysis of 
these values on the basis of the theoretical formulas (15), (19) and (20) allows concluding that the 
following approximate equation takes place: 
0 χ ≈ .             ( 5 7 )  
It means that function  () R z  is a quasi-linear function (for each branch of this function), 
which consists of two linear segments: 
( ) () 0 1 zzC R
+ =+ ⋅−  ;  
( ) ( )
0 C С z
++ = −  ; subject  to 0 zz > ;   (27) 
( ) () 0 1 zzC R
− =− ⋅−  ;  
( ) ( )
0 C С z
−− = +  ; subject  to 0 zz < .   (26) 
Diagram 1 illustrates linearity of the function  ( ) R z  within interval of z, which 
corresponds to period 1933-1941.  The Linear Regression of these data, except for 1938, 
confirms with high extent of probability the assumption of linearity of function  ( ) R z  
(
*2 0.98 0.99 R ≈÷). 
We used long-term average values of Depreciation Rate, Rate of Investment and Rate of 
Growth calculated on the basis of Kendrick’ data (Tables 2 and 4) as statistical indexes of 
parameters of Economic System Λ , ν  and a respectively. Since according to (57),  d Λ≈ ; we 








Const b Const e
Y
π
− +Λ ⋅ =− = +⋅ ⋅ .        ( 5 8 )   
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Average value a +Λ within interval 1933-1941, except for 1938, is equal to ≈ 0.1 (Table 
4). Least-squares estimator of parameters of function (58) gives the following value: 
0.863 Const ≈ .          ( 5 9 )  
Table 1 contains values calculated on the basis of this value of the constant, Const . 
Diagram 1 confirms hypothesis, which explains the Great Depression as result of reduction of 
value  0 z . The period 1922-29 corresponds to evolution of Economic System along the top 
evolution branch. In the period of crisis, 1929-33 a drop of the system to the lower branch takes 
place. This falling is accompanied by the left-shift of the point  0 z . The further evolution of the 
system takes place along the lower evolutional branch, 1933-41. Consequently hypothesis of 
long-term capital coefficient left-shift is confirmed. 










.         ( 6 0 )  
 Table1 and Diagram 1 indicate the sharp reduction of long-term capital coefficient,  0 z  
from value  0 before 1929 3.3 z ≈  to value  0 since 1929 2 z ≈ .  
Formula (60) gives us the following values: 
0 1909 1928 3.2 z
− ≈ ,  0 1933 1948 1.8 z
− ≈ . (See Tables 2 and 4). 
Finally let us show that theoretical formula (29) corresponds to the factual data also. The 
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.         ( 6 1 )  
Denotations in this formula correspond to denotations in the Figure 1. Diagram 1 and 
Table 1 allow considering two such phases of growth: 1922-29 and 1933-41. Since d ≈Λ we can 
verify the formula (61) using the average values within these intervals except last year (Tables 1, 
2 and 4). 
1922 29 0.0784 a
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1933 41 0.1107 a
























Factual values of duration are equal ≈ 7.75 and ≈ 8 years respectively. This result can be 
interpreted as yet one confirmation of Method of Systems Potential. 
Table 3 contains the results of calculation of factor-price of the Capital in nonfarm 
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Well-known that sum of Depreciation Rate and Interest Rate is the lower limit of cost of 
the capital. Factor-price of the capital (= cost of the capital) approaches to this level on the eve of 
a crisis. Comparison of columns (12) and (13) in Table 3 during 1922-29 years confirms this 
theoretical conclusion of economic theory. 
V. Conclusion. 
We have considered only the simplest option of application of the Method of System 
Potential with respect to the economy. 
Connecting efficiency of economic system and net profits, we simplified the real 
situation. However, this simplification is justified if we talk of economy in which decision-
making depends primarily on the value of net profit of the enterprise. It is surprising that even 
such a simplified model allows us to essentially advance our understanding of the economic 
system work. 
 The hysteresis cycles are a method of qualitative refreshment of the system. The renewal 
of economy after each crisis is a well-established fact. 
As applied to social systems, the cyclic dynamics is known as a theory of social 
metamorphoses, according to which the forms of ownership and institutes of administration in the 
society vary from time to time significantly. The very change lies in a global social reform that 
under certain circumstances may develop into a social revolution. Marx, one of the founders of 
the theory of social metamorphoses, was sceptical towards the ideas of reforming. He believed 
that the contradiction between the “productive forces” and “productive relations” underlying the 
crisis of the old management system could be solved only through a social revolution. He 
compared the revolution to child-delivery in the course of which a new social organism emerges. 
And though, by Hegel’s keen remark, the “experience and history teaches that nations and 
governments had taught nothing” [12], the lessons of social revolutions at least make people 
aware of the fact that the peaceful settlement of a conflict is always more preferable than war.  
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Figure 1. Realization Ratio, () R z  and Evolution Cycle. 
 
Figure 2. The Great Depression as catastrophe of Economic System and  
left-shift of the capital coefficient,  0 z . 
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Figure 3. The Surface of Evolution Catastrophe,  ( ) , Rzχ :  ()
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Figure 5. Realization ratio  () R z :  ()
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Diagram 1. Realization Ratio, calculated on the basis of Productivity of 
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Table 1. Realization Ratio, calculated on the basis of Productivity of Employed Capital    
  in Nonfarm Industry; 1921-49.        
  (Gross National Product and Profits are given in billions of current dollars).      
               
Year  Output; GNP, 
Y 
Profits after 
Taxes, П  Costs, C 









   Current dollars 
Profits/Output Ratio Output/Costs Ratio
R  Y/K  Z = R/ (Y/K) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Source or 
Calculation:  [20], [27]  [20], [27]  Y-П  П/Y Y/C  Y/C * Const  From Table 3.  (7):(8) 
   Current dollars        Const = 0.863      Const = 0.863 
1921 67,48  -0,060 67,54  -0,0009 0,999 0,862 0,302 2,855
1922 69,46  2,977 66,48  0,0429 1,045 0,902 0,316 2,849
1923 81,32  4,213 77,11  0,0518 1,055 0,910 0,310 2,936
1924 83,35  3,492 79,86  0,0419 1,044 0,901 0,305 2,952
1925 89,40  4,872 84,53  0,0545 1,058 0,913 0,310 2,941
1926 94,39  4,990 89,40  0,0529 1,056 0,911 0,303 3,009
1927 93,60  4,120 89,48  0,0440 1,046 0,903 0,297 3,037
1928 97,82  5,258 92,56  0,0538 1,057 0,912 0,289 3,151
1929 103,90  8,60 95,30  0,0828 1,090 0,941 0,292 3,217
1930 91,10  2,90 88,20  0,0318 1,033 0,891 0,267 3,343
1931 76,40 -0,90 77,30  -0,0118 0,988 0,853 0,271 3,142
1932 58,50 -2,70 61,20  -0,0462 0,956 0,825 0,268 3,078
1933 56,00  0,40 55,60  0,0071 1,007 0,869 0,280 3,101
1934 65,60  1,60 64,00  0,0244 1,025 0,885 0,307 2,881
1935 72,80  2,60 70,20  0,0357 1,037 0,895 0,329 2,724
1936 83,10  4,90 78,20  0,0590 1,063 0,917 0,361 2,540
1937 91,30  5,40 85,90  0,0591 1,063 0,917 0,358 2,560
1938 85,40  3,00 82,40  0,0351 1,036 0,894 0,360 2,486
1939 91,30  5,70 85,60  0,0624 1,067 0,920 0,389 2,368
1940 100,40  7,20 93,20  0,0717 1,077 0,930 0,411 2,260
1941 125,50  10,30 115,20  0,0821 1,089 0,940 0,435 2,162
1942 159,00  10,30 148,70  0,0648 1,069 0,923 0,430 2,144
1943 192,70  11,20 181,50  0,0581 1,062 0,916 0,450 2,034
1944 211,40  11,30 200,10  0,0535 1,056 0,912 0,481 1,896
1945 213,40  9,10 204,30  0,0426 1,045 0,901 0,487 1,850
1946 212,40  15,70 196,70  0,0739 1,080 0,932 0,486 1,917
1947 235,20  20,50 214,70  0,0872 1,095 0,945 0,478 1,979
1948 261,60  23,20 238,40  0,0887 1,097 0,947 0,479 1,978
1949 260,40  19,00 241,40  0,0730 1,079 0,931 0,472 1,971
               
  Notes:  (2) - Gross National Product for 1921-28 from Moore [20], Table 16.1, p.133; for 1929-49 from Summary [27], p.20;   
  (3) - Profits After Taxes for 1921-28 from Moore [20], Table 9.1, p.106; for 1929-49 - from Summary [27]; p.26;   
  (7) - Const is found by linear regression on the basis of formula: C/Y = Const + b*Const * Exp [-0.1 * t]; See Text.    
  (8) - Productivity of Employed Capital in Nonfarm Industry calculated from Solow [26];    
               






Table 2. Depreciation Rate, Rate of Investment; and Rate of Growth of Output in Economy of the U.S.A., 1909-49. 
(Gross National Product, Investment, Capital Consumption Allowances and Real Capital Stock are given in billions of 1929 dollars.    
Adjusted Kuznets’ Concepts from Kendrick' manuscript [14]).          
                
Gross Domestic Investment, GDI 
Year Output,  GNP  Rate of 
Growth 












Depreciation Rate  Rate of 
Investment 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
   [14]  From (2)  (5) + (6)  [14]  [14]  [14]  [14]  (7): (8)  (4): (2) 
1909 53,615 0,012 12,624 11,229 1,395 5,920 221,809 0,0267  0,2355
1910 54,263 0,020 12,470 11,595 0,875 6,158 228,359 0,0270  0,2298
1911 55,341 0,051 11,206 10,500 0,706 6,403 235,136 0,0272  0,2025
1912 58,171 0,046 12,900 11,741 1,159 6,637 240,387 0,0276  0,2218
1913 60,828 -0,083 13,842 12,684 1,158 6,886 247,125 0,0279  0,2276
1914 55,755 0,030 9,813 9,786 0,027 7,109 253,657 0,0280  0,1760
1915 57,434 0,155 9,635 9,406 0,229 7,285 259,727 0,0280  0,1678
1916 66,356 -0,025 12,893 11,226 1,667 7,489 264,460 0,0283  0,1943
1917 64,692 -0,016 11,914 11,428 0,486 7,754 269,779 0,0287  0,1842
1918 63,640 0,104 11,994 11,465 0,529 8,019 274,337 0,0292  0,1885
1919 70,271 0,016 14,614 11,749 2,865 8,650 278,121 0,0311  0,2080
1920 71,383 -0,042 15,039 10,726 4,313 8,603 282,540 0,0304  0,2107
1921 68,355 0,070 9,769 9,891 -0,122 8,183 286,280 0,0286  0,1429
1922 73,150 0,135 13,197 12,944 0,253 8,663 290,436 0,0298  0,1804
1923 82,994 0,027 18,210 15,435 2,775 8,905 298,526 0,0298  0,2194
1924 85,222 0,025 15,209 16,193 -0,984 9,043 308,547 0,0293  0,1785
1925 87,359 0,070 19,624 18,022 1,602 9,407 319,226 0,0295  0,2246
1926 93,438 0,008 20,469 19,312 1,157 10,086 332,064 0,0304  0,2191
1927 94,161 0,017 19,163 18,785 0,378 10,163 344,133 0,0295  0,2035
1928 95,715 0,060 18,346 18,763 -0,417 10,592 354,809 0,0299  0,1917
1929 101,444 -0,098 20,352 18,678 1,674 10,994 365,089 0,0301  0,2006
1930 91,513 -0,079 14,870 15,428 -0,558 10,902 373,097 0,0292  0,1625
1931 84,300 -0,162 10,862 11,579 -0,717 10,662 376,298 0,0283  0,1288
1932 70,682 -0,033 4,050 7,318 -3,268 10,246 373,175 0,0275  0,0573
1933 68,337 0,092 3,022 6,370 -3,348 9,960 365,427 0,0273  0,0442
1934 74,609 0,150 5,306 8,096 -2,790 9,995 358,425 0,0279  0,0711
1935 85,806 0,116 12,432 9,881 2,551 10,188 356,808 0,0286  0,1449
1936 95,798 0,085 14,840 14,123 0,717 10,563 358,540 0,0295  0,1549
1937 103,917 -0,070 19,261 14,717 4,544 10,884 364,078 0,0299  0,1853
1938 96,670 0,073 12,006 12,963 -0,957 10,923 368,057 0,0297  0,1242
1939 103,736 0,089 15,426 14,788 0,638 11,086 370,930 0,0299  0,1487
1940 112,961 0,118 19,310 16,201 3,109 11,401 379,162 0,0301  0,1709
1941 126,237 -0,029 26,826 21,007 5,819 12,457 389,744 0,0320  0,2125
1942 122,571 -0,005 26,548 24,157 2,391 13,934 396,616 0,0351  0,2166
1943 121,918 0,039 25,049 26,006 -0,957 14,785 396,195 0,0373  0,2055
1944 126,633 0,028 26,077 27,113 -1,036 15,907 391,997 0,0406  0,2059
1945 130,218 0,166 22,256 23,531 -1,275 16,217 387,229 0,0419  0,1709
1946 151,895 0,011 25,923 19,705 6,218 14,658 390,267 0,0376  0,1707
1947 153,515 0,035 22,321 23,118 -0,797 16,558 400,991 0,0413  0,1454
1948 158,828 -0,031 29,944 25,879 4,065 18,012 415,492 0,0434  0,1885
1949 153,970    22,877 25,667 -2,790 19,014 430,424 0,0442  0,1486
                
  Notes:  (2) - Gross National Product and (7) - Capital Consumption Allowances from Table A-I, p. 290-92;      
  (5) and (6) - Investment from Table A-IIa, p.293-95;          
  (8) – Real Capital Stock from Table A-XV; p.320-322.           
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Table 3. Productivity of the Capital and Factor-price of the Capital in Nonfarm Industry, calculated on the basis of Solow' data [26]; 1909-49.      
                     













Capital stock per 
man-hour, ks 
Realization 
Ratio  Factor-price of the Capital Depreciation Rate, 
DR 




(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Source or 
Calculation:  [26] [26]  [26]  w  = y * (1 - v)  [26]  pec = y/ke  ks = ke * 100/f From Table 1. r = (0.863 * y/R - w)/ke  From Table 2  (10) - (11)  From Moore [20]; Tables 
25.0 and 26.0 
1909 91,1 0,335 0,623 0,414 2,06 0,302 2,26     0,0267    
1910 92,8 0,330 0,616 0,413 2,10 0,293 2,26     0,0270    
1911 90,6 0,335 0,647 0,430 2,17 0,298 2,40     0,0272    
1912 93,0 0,330 0,652 0,437 2,21 0,295 2,38     0,0276    
1913 91,8 0,334 0,680 0,453 2,23 0,305 2,43     0,0279    
1914 83,6 0,325 0,682 0,460 2,20 0,310 2,63     0,0280    
1915 84,5 0,344 0,669 0,439 2,26 0,296 2,67     0,0280    
1916 93,7 0,358 0,700 0,449 2,34 0,299 2,50     0,0283    
1917 94,0 0,370 0,679 0,428 2,21 0,307 2,35     0,0287    
1918 94,5 0,342 0,729 0,480 2,22 0,328 2,35     0,0292    
1919 93,1 0,354 0,767 0,495 2,47 0,311 2,65     0,0311    
1920 92,8 0,319 0,721 0,491 2,58 0,279 2,78     0,0304    
1921 76,9 0,369 0,770 0,486 2,55 0,302 3,32 0,862 0,112 0,0286 0,083 0,067
1922 81,7 0,339 0,788 0,521 2,49 0,316 3,05 0,902 0,094 0,0298 0,064 0,055
1923 92,1 0,337 0,809 0,536 2,61 0,310 2,83 0,910 0,088 0,0298 0,059 0,055
1924 88,0 0,330 0,836 0,560 2,74 0,305 3,11 0,901 0,088 0,0293 0,059 0,051
1925 91,1 0,336 0,872 0,579 2,81 0,310 3,08 0,913 0,087 0,0295 0,058 0,050
1926 92,5 0,327 0,869 0,585 2,87 0,303 3,10 0,911 0,083 0,0304 0,053 0,051
1927 90,0 0,323 0,871 0,590 2,93 0,297 3,26 0,903 0,083 0,0295 0,053 0,050
1928 90,0 0,338 0,874 0,579 3,02 0,289 3,36 0,912 0,082 0,0299 0,052 0,054
1929 92,5 0,332 0,895 0,598 3,06 0,292 3,31 0,941 0,073 0,0301 0,043 0,060
1930 88,1 0,347 0,880 0,575 3,30 0,267 3,75 0,891 0,084 0,0292 0,055 0,051
1931 78,2 0,325 0,904 0,610 3,33 0,271 4,26 0,853 0,091 0,0283 0,063 0,047
1932 67,9 0,397 0,879 0,530 3,28 0,268 4,83 0,825 0,119 0,0275 0,091 0,050
1933 66,5 0,362 0,869 0,554 3,10 0,280 4,66 0,869 0,099 0,0273 0,072 0,048
1934 70,9 0,355 0,921 0,594 3,00 0,307 4,23 0,885 0,101 0,0279 0,074 0,042
1935 73,0 0,351 0,943 0,612 2,87 0,329 3,93 0,895 0,104 0,0286 0,075 0,037
1936 77,3 0,357 0,982 0,631 2,72 0,361 3,52 0,917 0,108 0,0295 0,078 0,034
1937 81,0 0,340 0,971 0,641 2,71 0,358 3,35 0,917 0,101 0,0299 0,071 0,033
1938 74,7 0,331 1,000 0,669 2,78 0,360 3,72 0,894 0,106 0,0297 0,077 0,032
1939 77,2 0,347 1,034 0,675 2,66 0,389 3,45 0,920 0,111 0,0299 0,081 0,021
1940 80,6 0,357 1,082 0,696 2,63 0,411 3,26 0,930 0,117 0,0301 0,087 0,021
1941 86,8 0,377 1,122 0,699 2,58 0,435 2,97 0,940 0,128 0,0320 0,096 0,020
1942 93,6 0,356 1,136 0,732 2,64 0,430 2,82 0,923 0,125 0,0351 0,090 0,022
1943 97,4 0,342 1,180 0,776 2,62 0,450 2,69 0,916 0,128 0,0373 0,091 0,026
1944 98,4 0,332 1,265 0,845 2,63 0,481 2,67 0,912 0,134 0,0406 0,093 0,025
1945 96,5 0,314 1,296 0,889 2,66 0,487 2,76 0,901 0,132 0,0419 0,090 0,022
1946 94,8 0,312 1,215 0,836 2,50 0,486 2,64 0,932 0,116 0,0376 0,078 0,021
1947 95,4 0,327 1,194 0,804 2,50 0,478 2,62 0,945 0,115 0,0413 0,073 0,021
1948 95,7 0,332 1,221 0,816 2,55 0,479 2,66 0,947 0,117 0,0434 0,073 0,025
1949 93,0 0,326 1,275 0,859 2,70 0,472 2,90 0,931 0,119 0,0442 0,075 0,027 
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Table 4. Long-term values of parameters of Economic System, calculated on the basis of Kendrick' data [14].   
  (See Table 2)            
              




Investment  Depreciation Rate 
Sum of Depreciation 
Rate and Rate of 
Growth  
 








1  Average, 1909-22  0,0337 0,1978 0,0285 0,0622 3,1818  
2  Average, 1909-23  0,0332 0,1993 0,0286 0,0618 3,2239  
3  Average, 1909-24  0,0327 0,1980 0,0286 0,0613 3,2271  
4  Average, 1909-25  0,0349 0,1995 0,0287 0,0636 3,1392  
5  Average, 1909-26  0,0334 0,2006 0,0288 0,0622 3,2281  
6  Average, 1909-27  0,0325 0,2008 0,0288 0,0613 3,2752  
7  Average, 1909-28  0,0339 0,2003 0,0289 0,0627 3,1938  
   Average for 1-7 periods:  0,0335 0,1995 0,0287 0,0622 3,2099  
1  Average, 1933-34  0,1209 0,0577 0,0276 0,1485 0,3884  
2  Average, 1933-35  0,1194 0,0867 0,0279 0,1473 0,5887  
3  Average, 1933-36  0,1108 0,1038 0,0283 0,1391 0,7464  
4  Average, 1933-37  0,0747 0,1201 0,0286 0,1033 1,1629  
5  Average, 1933-38  0,0744 0,1208 0,0288 0,1032 1,1705  
6  Average, 1933-39  0,0765 0,1248 0,0289 0,1054 1,1835  
7  Average, 1933-40  0,0816 0,1305 0,0291 0,1107 1,1793  
8  Average, 1933-41  0,0693 0,1396 0,0294 0,0987 1,4146  
9  Average, 1933-42  0,0618 0,1473 0,0300 0,0918 1,6046  
10  Average, 1933-43  0,0597 0,1526 0,0306 0,0904 1,6886  
11  Average, 1933-44  0,0571 0,1571 0,0315 0,0886 1,7728  
12  Average, 1933-45  0,0655 0,1581 0,0323 0,0978 1,6168  
13  Average, 1933-46  0,0616 0,1590 0,0327 0,0943 1,6870  
14  Average, 1933-47  0,0598 0,1581 0,0332 0,0930 1,6994  
15  Average, 1933-48  0,0542 0,1600 0,0339 0,0880 1,8179  
  
Average for 13-15 
periods:  0,0585 0,1591 0,0332 0,0918 1,7348  
Sources:  [14] - Kendrick, J.W.; 1961, "Productivity Trends in the United States", The Nat. Bureau of Econ. Res.; General Series, No.71, Princeton;   
  [20] - Moore, Geoffrey H.; 1961, "Business Cycle Indicators", The Nat. Bureau of Econ. Res.; Studies in Business Cycles, No.11, Princeton; 
  [26] - Solow, Robert M.; 1957, "Technical Change and production function", The Review of Economics and Statistics; Vol.39; No.3; 
  [27] - Summary National Income and Product Series: Annually, 1929-89, Survey of Current Business, September 1990; 